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I. The Trees in the Garden 
“The Hebrew Bible is terse, it does not use three words where two or 
one or none will do,” says Pamela Tamarkin Reis.1 This view surely ap-
plies to the passage concerning the trees in the Garden of Eden in the 
Book of Genesis.  
 
Out of the ground the Lord God made to grow every tree that 
is pleasant to the sight and good for food; the tree of life also 
in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil. (Gen 2:9) 
 
If economy of words is a feature of the Hebrew Bible generally, it 
rises to dizzying levels in this passage. Gerhard von Rad, citing an un-
named source, refers to this portion of Scripture as “one of the greatest 
accomplishments of all times in the history of thought,” adding that 
“[w]onderful clarity and utter simplicity characterize the representation 
of the individual scenes.”2 His admiration, it must be noted, is primarily 
of the disproportion between “the meagerness of [the author’s] re-
sources” and the magnitude of the message that is communicated. Na-
hum Sarna, contrasting the Genesis narrative with other ancient attempts 
                                                
1 Pamela Tamarkin Reis, “What Cain Said: A Note on Genesis 4.8,” JSOT 27 
(2002): 110.  
2 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, 2nd ed. (trans. John H. Marks; OTL; London: SCM, 
1963), 24.  
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to write an account of human beginnings, likewise notes that “[t]he He-
brew account is matchless in its solemn and majestic simplicity.”3 
To many a reader, however, this passage is more simple than clear. 
The economy of words is cause for despair, not praise. While the writer 
may not use “three words where two or one or none will do,”4 the reader 
may be yearning precisely for the words the author omits.  
Three items are specified in the passage that introduces the trees: 
God has created trees “pleasant to the sight and good for food; the tree of 
life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil” (Gen 2:9). It is evident that the two named trees are the 
author’s particular interest, although they share important characteristics 
with the unnamed trees. Given that the trees that God made to grow in 
general terms are said to be “pleasant to the sight and good for food,” we 
should expect this feature to apply to the named trees as well. This ques-
tion need not be left on the level of assumption. In regard to the third 
item on the list, “the tree of knowledge of good and evil,” we are later 
informed that this tree “was good for food, and that it was a delight to the 
eyes” (Gen 3:6). As to beauty and apparent utility, the named trees are 
not inferior to the other trees in the garden. 
The tree of life was “in the midst of the garden” (Gen 2:9). To be at 
the center in terms of location is also to be at the center in terms of im-
portance. The location of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is not 
specified at the point where the tree is introduced to the reader, but the 
text implies that the two named trees are paired. Again, we are helped by 
information supplied at a later point. In the woman’s answer to the ser-
pent she refers to it as the tree “in the middle of the garden” (Gen 3:2). 
To the extent that location signifies importance, the tree of knowledge is 
an item of high priority. The notion that it is “incidental that there are 
two trees,” as suggested by Walter Brueggemann, is not persuasive.5 If, 
too, there is a movement in the text from the simple to the sublime, an 
order of priority from lesser to greater, and a trajectory from lower to 
higher, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil occupies a position of 
spectacular distinction. This tree seems “good for food, and . . . a delight 
to the eyes” (Gen 3:6), and it is located “in the middle of the garden” 
(Gen 3:2).  
                                                
3 Nahum Sarna, Understanding Genesis: The Heritage of Biblical Israel (New York: 
Schocken, 1966), 10.  
4 Reis, “What Cain Said,” 110. 
5 Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Interpretation; Atlanta: John Knox, 1982), 45. 
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
84 
The exceptional character of this tree applies not only to its location 
but also to its role in the story. A “tree of life” is known in other ancient 
narratives of origins but not a tree of knowledge. Sarna claims that this 
tree “has no parallel outside of our biblical Garden of Eden story.”6 At-
tention in the story is focused on this tree even more than on the tree of 
life, further highlighting its importance.7 I am therefore tempted to add 
one word concerning this tree where the writer thought that none would 
do, “Out of the ground the Lord God made to grow every tree that is 
pleasant to the sight and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst 
of the garden, and [even] the tree of the knowledge of good and evil 
(Gen 2:9). In order to forestall a ho-hum reading, it may be appropriate 
to end the sentence with an exclamation mark. In short, we do well to 
pay attention to this tree and the message it represents.  
 
II. An Expression of Core Convictions 
Having ascertained that purpose and priority are in view, we are 
ready to hear the instruction that is given with respect to the tree of 
knowledge.  
 
And the Lord God commanded the man, “You may freely eat 
of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it 
you shall die.” (Gen 2:16-17) 
 
Where should we place the emphasis in this statement? Considering 
the statement as a whole, should the focus be on permission or on restric-
tion? Considering the tree of knowledge, is the prohibition not to eat of 
the tree of knowledge meant as a restriction? What is the message of this 
unique tree? 
A reading that puts the weight on quantitative parameters leaves the 
impression that the prohibition not to eat of the tree imposes a restriction. 
In a garden of 3000 trees, choosing this number for the purpose of illus-
tration, one tree is now forbidden territory. The arithmetic is easy. 2999 
trees is one less than 3000, and the difference, albeit a small one, signi-
fies a restriction. In quantitative terms, a person is more restricted who 
has access to 2999 trees rather than to 3000. 
James Barr registers a strident objection to the story not only because 
it is imposing a restriction but also because the alleged restriction lacks 
                                                
6 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 26.  
7 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 26.  
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even the slimmest of hints at good sense.8 His rhetoric is unsparing: Barr 
refers to “the sheer irrationality of the command,” aggravated by the fact 
that it threatens with death “the slightest deviation from the slightest di-
vine command”; worse yet, the command is “devoid of perceptible ethi-
cal basis”; still worse, God “has made an ethically arbitrary prohibition, 
and backed it up with a threat to kill, which in the event, he does nothing 
to carry out.”9 Adding up the dubious ingredients associated with the tree 
of knowledge, God is the one “who is placed in a rather ambiguous 
light.”10 This assessment goes beyond a mere quantitative assessment, 
but one should be careful not to miss the uncharitable and sterile logic 
underlying it. Deprivation of freedom is the name of the game. The tree 
of knowledge represents a meaningless restriction to the point that, if it 
were not stated clearly enough already, God is the person who “comes 
out of this story with a slightly shaky moral record.”11 The serpent that 
speaks later in the story (Gen 3:1-5), also operating within a quantitative 
framework, will not say it better or more forcefully.  
If, however, our reading takes the qualitative route, the result will be 
quite different. What the quantitative measure construes as a restriction 
has exactly the opposite significance when we measure the tree of 
knowledge with a qualitative measuring stick. Now it is not the raw 
number of trees that matters but their meaning. In this scenario the qual-
ity of human existence is not to be measured according to material pa-
rameters but in spiritual and political terms. Where the quantitative as-
sessment is forced to register a subtraction, placing the tree of knowledge 
in the column of loss, the qualitative approach sees in the tree an added 
quality, recording it in the column of gain.  
R. W. L. Moberly says of the command as a whole that “God’s 
words had emphasized freedom—the man could eat of every tree with 
only one prohibited.”12 This view is good as far as it goes, but it suffers 
under the implied quantitative constraint. In other words, freedom is the 
predominant emphasis, restriction the lesser one, but there is nevertheless 
a restriction. An unapologetic qualitative reading is altogether different, 
construing the apparent restriction not as a limitation of freedom but as 
its confirmation. First, as Sidney Greidanus suggests, “God is good in 
                                                
8 James Barr, The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality (London: SCM 
Press, 1992), 12.  
9 Barr, The Garden of Eden, 12.  
10 Barr, The Garden of Eden, 12.  
11 Barr, The Garden of Eden, 13.  
12 R. W. L. Moberly, “Did the Serpent Get It Right?” JTS 39 (1988): 6. 
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giving this commandment, for they are free to eat from any tree in the 
Garden, including the tree of life, with one exception.”13 Second, how-
ever, and contrary not only to the most intuitive interpretation but also to 
Barr’s critique, the prohibition is not really intended as a restriction. 
“This one prohibition is also good because God treats man as a free 
moral agent,” says Greidanus.14 The added quality of the forbidden tree 
is the quality of choice.  
In this scenario, consent and choice are set forth as core ingredients 
of God’s way. When the tree of knowledge is viewed qualitatively, the 
thought of seeing it removed is more disturbing than the thought of keep-
ing it precisely with respect to the point that is unsettling within the 
quantitative framework. The latter sees less freedom, the former sees 
more. Indeed, the qualitative reading sees freedom itself. Remove the 
tree of knowledge, this logic suggests, and what is thereby removed is 
not the opportunity to eat but the reality of choice. We might wish to 
qualify this view by admitting that the author, through the symbolism of 
the tree, “teaches that the human person is free in all respects but one: 
determining what is right and wrong solely on the basis of human in-
sight,”15 but even this admission should not take away from the tree the 
connotation that choice itself is the primary function of the tree. Here we 
find the ‘voting booth’ of the Garden of Eden, the place where human 
beings are freely offered an opportunity to express approval or disap-
proval with respect to the terms of their existence.  
At this point it is appropriate to recall that the text of Genesis, as 
noted, is a text of few words, placing more responsibility on the shoul-
ders of the reader than the reader feels like carrying. More than one op-
tion is available to the interpreter, and many more than the ones that have 
been sampled so far. Nevertheless, computing evidence that lies on the 
surface of the text, we cannot treat the two named trees in the Garden of 
Eden dismissively. The trees share conspicuous characteristics. They are 
acts of God, located in the middle of the garden. What “the Lord God 
made to grow” is redolent with intent and importance. The sparse ac-
count tells us something about the Person who does these things. In theo-
logical and ideological terms, I suggest that the named trees should be 
                                                
13 Sidney Greidanus, “Preaching Christ from the Narrative of the Fall,” BSac 161 
(2004): 266. 
14 Greidanus, “Preaching Christ from the Narrative of the Fall”: 266. 
15 Paul F. Scotchmer, “Lessons from Paradise on Work, Marriage, and Freedom: A 
Study of Genesis 2:4-3:24,” ERT 28 (2004): 81-82.  
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seen as core convictions of the Agent behind these actions. The acting 
subject in the account, rather than the narrator, is in the process of 
achieving not only “one of the greatest accomplishments of all times in 
the history of thought,” as in von Rad’s version,16 but a costly and gener-
ous ideological commitment. This commitment, in turn, admitting that 
the Hebrew Bible has left out the explanatory notes that would simplify 
the task of interpretation, should broadly speaking be seen as the gift of 
freedom. Limiting the options even more so as to avoid a comprehensive 
discussion of the elusive notion of freedom, the part of ‘freedom’ that 
this essay finds enshrined in the tree of knowledge is the absence of co-
ercion.  
If this seems like a timid aspiration and a peripheral concern, what 
follows might prove otherwise. Brueggemann, who sees in the text con-
cerning the tree of knowledge a triplet denoting vocation, permission, 
and prohibition, finds that little attention has been given to the mandate 
of vocation or the gift of permission.17 In the eyes of many interpreters, 
says Brueggemann, God’s will for vocation and freedom has been lost to 
the effect that God “is chiefly remembered as the one who prohibits.”18 
This is not an exaggeration, nor is it worded strongly enough. God has 
been seen not only as a God who prohibits but also as a God who co-
erces, even though, as the present interpretation sees it, the ideology that 
is revealed in the Garden of Eden is precisely and emphatically an ideol-
ogy that eschews coercion. The writer of Genesis leaves it to the inter-
preter to name the unnamed idea and to ponder its implication, and this is 
just what interpreters have done.  
 
III. Pursuing the Meaning of the Tree of Knowledge 
The tree of life is virtually self-explanatory, but how has the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil been understood? How should it be under-
stood, knowing the role this tree plays in the remainder of the narrative 
and the downward course emerging from its conspicuous location in the 
midst of the garden?  
1. The Politics of Paradise. To early Christian interpreters of the 
Genesis story, the message of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is 
that human beings are meant to be free moral agents along the lines sug-
gested above. God’s intention for humanity is life as revealed in the tree 
                                                
16 von Rad, Genesis, 24. 
17 Brueggemann, Genesis, 46. 
18 Brueggemann, Genesis, 46. 
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of life, but life as such is not the whole story. Sarna seems to operate 
within the boundaries of the text when he assigns a subordinate role to 
the tree of life in the Garden of Eden story, but he exaggerates when he 
claims that the Bible relegates this tree to an insignificant role and that 
Scripture, in his words, “dissociates itself completely” from the implied 
pre-occupation with immortality.19 One should nevertheless listen to the 
Jewish point of view that the concern of the story “is with the issues of 
living rather than with the question of death, with morality rather than 
mortality.”20 
In the eyes of the earliest Christian interpreters, the ideology of the 
tree of knowledge is the ideology of freedom. Its political corollary en-
tails repudiation of coercion. The tree of knowledge embodies the means 
by which God’s will is to come to expression in the lives of human be-
ings; it is to happen freely, without compulsion or force. Elaine Pagels 
has written lucidly about the early Christian understanding of Genesis 
under the title of “The Politics of Paradise.”21 Adopting the political an-
gle, the tree of knowledge stands as a political and constitutional state-
ment whose message is freedom.  
If, as suggested above, we see the tree of knowledge as a ‘core con-
viction,’ it will be worthwhile to listen to what early Christian interpret-
ers say about this conviction in the context of the Genesis creation ac-
count, using the Christian apologist Origen (185-254 AD) as an example. 
According to Origen, God “will subject all rational creatures to himself 
through persuasion, not through constraint, and thus bring their freedom 
to fulfillment in obedience to the divine will.”22 An individual “should 
not be compelled by force against its free choice to any action except that 
to which the motions of its own mind lead it,” says Origen.23 By these 
and other statements, Origen is remembered as a leading exponent of 
freedom, and freedom, as Origen sees it, is “the most general of all the 
                                                
19 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 27.  
20 Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 27.  
21 Elaine Pagels, “The Politics of Paradise; Augustine’s Exegesis of Genesis 1-3 ver-
sus that of John Chrysostom,” HTR 78 (1985): 67-99. 
22 John R. Sachs, “Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology,” Theological Studies 54 
(1993): 628.  
23 Origen on First Principles (trans. G. W. Butterworth; London: Society for Pro-
moting Christian Knowledge, 1936), II.1.2.  
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laws of the universe.”24 The terms of human existence were originally 
constituted under the rubric of freedom. Until Origen’s time and for an-
other half century or so, declining upon the ascent of the emperor 
Constantine, this view represents the thrust of the Christian interpretation 
of the Genesis narrative of the fall.  
Further corroboration is in order for this view to be sustained, but on 
the whole I find it easy to agree with the tenor of the early Christian un-
derstanding. Absent the tree of knowledge, a thought experiment I have 
attempted many times in various contexts, I have not been the only one 
concluding that human existence would thereby be deprived of choice, 
consent, and even responsibility. Were the tree of knowledge to be re-
moved, the terms of human existence would be diminished. However, 
human dignity, important though it is, must not be held as the breaking 
point. The trees that are specifically named in the Garden of Eden must 
primarily be seen as statements about God and as representations of 
God’s core convictions. In the form of the tree of knowledge, God makes 
willing, intelligent consent an essential ingredient in the divine-human 
relationship.  
Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 334-ca. 394) was a great admirer of Origen, 
but he serves notice that already in his time, early in the Constantinian 
era, the tree of knowledge is acquiring a negative connotation. Gregory 
disputes the centrality of the tree in the Garden of Eden on purely geo-
metric grounds. In his line of argument, the notion of two trees in the 
middle means that the story should not be taken literally and is the first 
step toward stripping the tree of ideological prestige. Quite simply, 
Gregory will argue, it is impossible to have two trees at the center.  
 
But if another center is set alongside the center, the circle must 
necessarily be shifted along with its center, with the result that 
the former center is no longer the midst. Since, then, the Gar-
den in that place is one, why does the text say that each of the 
trees is to be treated as something separate, and that both of 
them are at the center, when the account which tells us that the 
works of God are “very good” teaches that the killer-tree is no 
part of God’s planting?25 
                                                
24 René Cadiou, Introduction au système d’Origène (Paris: Société d’édition “Les 
Belles Lettres,” 1932), quoted in Jean Danielou, Origen (trans. Walter Mitchell; London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1955), 205-206. 
25 Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. in Cant., praef. (GNO 6:10.17-11.5., quoted in Richard 
A. Norris, Jr., “Two Trees in the Midst of the Garden (Genesis 2:9b): Gregory of Nyssa 
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The ideological shift of emphasis is more subtle than this quotation 
suggests, but the rhetorical about-face is remarkable. Designating the tree 
of knowledge as “the killer-tree” stigmatizes it as a negative, with Greg-
ory following through by stating that this tree actually “is no part of 
God’s planting.”26 Richard Norris points out that Gregory has not given 
up on the idea of human choice in the sense that “the ‘killer-tree’ be-
comes a killer only if and when it is chosen by a human agent,”27 but his 
rhetoric nevertheless has the impact of casting the tree in negative terms. 
Norris deems Gregory’s attempt to give a plausible account of the origin 
of evil a failure, finding it unintelligible. The project fails, he says, “be-
cause at every point its plausibility depends on the one thing Gregory 
cannot allow; namely, the existence apart from human choice of some 
factor or reality that by its intrinsic magnetism or attractiveness deceives 
the mind, overwhelms the will, and so orients human loving away from 
the authentic Good.”28 This attitude on the part of Gregory means that he 
resists the dualist implication of the Genesis account, the notion of a real 
Enemy. By eschewing this option, Gregory deprives himself not only of 
other ways to account for the reality of evil, but he also cuts himself off 
from a view that might allow him to see the tree of knowledge in positive 
and even protective terms. In the present context it is sufficient to con-
clude that a trend is afoot in the Church to see the tree of knowledge in 
negative terms.  
2. Endorsing Coercion. With Augustine (354-430 AD), there is 
considerable ambiguity with respect to his interpretation of paradise and 
his view of freedom,29 but this ambiguity is in itself testimony of the shift 
that is occurring and of which he is a leading voice. Augustine will con-
done coercion against the Donatists and other dissenters,30 but he cannot 
do so except by reconfiguring the theology found in the first chapters of 
                                                                                                         
and the Puzzle of Human Evil,” in In Dominico Eloquio: Essays in Patristic Exegesis in 
Honor of Robert Louis Wilken, ed. Paul Blowers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 220. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Norris, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Puzzle of Human Evil,” 232. 
28 Norris, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Puzzle of Human Evil,” 239-240. 
29 Augustine’s preoccupation with Genesis is legendary and is not limited to his ma-
jor works on the subject; cf. The Literal Meaning of Genesis (trans. John Hammond Tay-
lor; New York: Newman, 1982; On Genesis [De Genesi contra Manichaeos] (trans. Ed-
mund Hill; New York: New City, 2002). 
30 John R. Bowlin (“Augustine on Justifying Coercion,” Annual of the Society of 
Christian Ethics, 17 [1997], 49-70) confirms that Augustine became a believer in, and a 
promoter of, coercion, but he also downplays its significance as though it is no more than 
what people might condone or approve of under certain circumstances even today.  
TONSTAD: THE MESSAGE OF THE TREES 
91 
Genesis. “What earlier apologists celebrate as God’s gift to humankind—
free will, liberty, autonomy, self-government—Augustine characterizes 
in surprisingly negative terms,” Pagels observes.31 Exegesis of the text in 
Genesis is yielding ground to contextual, political pressure. The church, 
long a threatened minority, is now ascendant; it is in the driver’s seat, so 
to speak. Augustine revises the map of interpretation to fit the new land-
scape. The views of earlier Christian interpreters are in decline, as is their 
emphasis on the ideology of freedom and their opposition to coercion. 
This trend, says Elizabeth Clark, “made effective in the West the flour-
ishing of a Christian theology whose central concerns were human sin-
fulness, not human potentiality; divine determination, not human free-
dom and responsibility; God’s mystery, not God’s justice.”32 Augustine’s 
theology triumphs, but its triumph requires “the capitulation of all who 
held to the classical proclamation concerning human freedom, once re-
garded as the heart of the Christian gospel.”33 His view of the politics of 
paradise becomes the political manual not only for his own time but also 
for posterity. In the words of Peter Brown, Augustine is the man who 
writes “the only full justification, in the Early Church, of the right of the 
state to suppress non-Catholics.”34 
Augustine is a complex figure. He deserves admiration for the raw if 
sometimes indulgent honesty of his introspection.35 He deals with human 
weakness and failings with sensitivity and nuance that surpass his oppo-
nents. He perceives the oneness of humanity and has a Catholic vision of 
inclusion that is exceptional and praiseworthy. And yet one thing does 
not follow from his sometimes implied and sometimes explicit view of 
the human condition. If experience confirms that human beings seem 
powerless against sin, it does not follow that God will remedy the prob-
lem by means of coercion. Indeed, if individuals have convictions other 
than those considered orthodox by the Catholic Church, it does not fol-
low that the Church is free to call on the arm of the state to coerce these 
individuals into line. The early Christian apologists looked to the Genesis 
story of the fall to prove the God-given rights of conscience against the 
intrusive will of the state. Augustine increasingly looks to the same story 
in order to promote subservience to authority and obedience to the 
                                                
31 Pagels, “The Politics of Paradise”: 78.  
32 Elizabeth Clark, The Origenist Controversy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), 250. 
33 Pagels, “Politics of Paradise”: 99.  
34 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 235. 
35 Augustine, Confessions (trans. Henry Chadwick; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991).  
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Church. In his interpretation of Genesis, the ideology of freedom is in 
eclipse.36  
3. Sins of Omission. Traveling downstream from Augustine, we find 
notions of freedom diluted and increasingly on the wane in Christian 
theology, set on its trajectory by the great Latin father. Theology is pre-
occupied by the tree of life, increasingly oblivious to the meaning of the 
tree of knowledge. Anselm of Canterbury, living six-hundred years after 
Augustine, is remembered as the theologian who wrote an influential 
treatise on the atonement.37 It is less well known that Anselm in 1099 
presented his treatise to pope Urban II, the man who four years earlier 
launched the most cruel and ill-conceived Christian enterprise of all time, 
the Crusades. Anselm says nothing about the Crusades. Even when he 
writes about free will, which he does,38 or about the fall of Satan, which 
he also does,39 Anselm seems blissfully detached from contemporary 
reality, and he fails to espouse a notion of freedom that has a bearing on 
the intensely cruel and immensely consequential atrocities of which the 
Church of his time is the instigator. The suggestion may seem anachro-
nistic and unfair, but perhaps Anselm deserves to be remembered as 
much for what he did not do as for his accomplishments. This is to say, 
when a treatise on the tree of knowledge is needed—when opposition to 
the Crusades is needed, and when the Church needs to be reminded that 
the end does not justify the means—the best the leading theologian of 
this time can do is to produce a theoretical treatise on how the death of 
Jesus secures access to the tree of life. Indeed, when a treatise is needed 
to rein in the savagery of the Crusaders, taking the death of Christ to be 
the most compelling argument against such savagery, Anselm and his 
contemporaries are so blinded by their presuppositions that they cannot 
see it.  
We revere the Reformation, but it, too, is almost exclusively preoc-
cupied with the tree of life, metaphorically speaking. The early Luther 
                                                
36 Rowan A. Greer, “Augustine’s Transformation of the Free Will Defense,” Faith 
and Philosophy 13 (1996): 471-486; Fred Berthold, Jr., “Free Will and Theodicy in 
Augustine: An Exposition and Critique,” Religious Studies 17 (1982): 525-535.  
37 Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man, in The Major Works (Oxford: Ox-
ford UP, 1998), 261-356.  
38 Anselm, On Free Will, in The Major Works, 175-192.  
39 Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, in The Major Works, 193-232.  
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speaks forcefully and with exceptional eloquence about freedom, 40 but 
he ends up condoning coercion, and he urges his contemporaries to prac-
tice coercion of the most blood-curdling and cruel kind against the 
Jews.41 Zwingli preaches free grace, but he votes with the city council of 
Zürich to drown the Anabaptist Felix Manz for committing the sin of 
believer’s baptism.42 Calvin teaches grace with conviction and clarity, 
but he casts his vote with the city council of Geneva in favor of burning 
the physician and lay theologian Michael Servetus at the stake for the 
crime of advocating an unorthodox Christology.43  
 
IV. Reclaiming the Ideology of Freedom 
1. Roger Williams. There are not a thousand points of light in this 
landscape, but there are occasional points of light, moments of excep-
tional perception, insight, and courage. Roger Williams, in a little known 
booklet entitled The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Con-
science, published in 1644, asserts that “an [enforced] uniformity of re-
ligion throughout a nation or civil state, confounds the civil and relig-
ious, denies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that Jesus 
Christ is come in the Flesh.”44 Mainstream renditions of church history 
will object that the doctrine of the Trinity was enshrined in the beliefs of 
                                                
40 Martin Luther, “Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,” in 
Luther’s Works 45; The Christian and Society (trans. J. J. Schindel; ed. Walther I. Brandt 
and Helmut T. Lehmann; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1962), 80-128.  
41 Martin Luther, “On the Jews and Their Lies,” in Luther’s Works 47; The Christian 
and Society IV (trans. Martin H. Bertram, ed. Franklin Sherman; Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1971), 135-305. 
42 William R. Estep, The Anabaptist Story: An Introduction to Sixteenth-Century 
Anabaptism (3rd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 43-48. 
43 John T. McNeill (The History and Character of Calvinism [London: Oxford UP, 
1954], 174) claims that Servetus was drawn to Geneva by “a fatal fascination,” “like a 
moth to the candle flame,” so as to suggest that Servetus brought the calamity on himself. 
T. H. L. Parker (John Calvin [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975], 121) is even less sympa-
thetic, accusing him of “twenty years of play-acting” and describing Servetus’ final and 
fatal visit to Geneva as “an incredibly foolish thing,” as if on the assumption that it was 
the victim’s responsibility to avoid being executed. The image of an inconsistent and 
opportunistic personality is belied by the fact that Servetus was willing to die for his con-
victions, maintaining sufficient composure in the face of the flames to hold his denial of 
the Trinity till the end. Servetus is said to have prayed, “Jesus, Son of the Eternal God, 
have mercy on me,” not “Eternal Son of God.”  
44 Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience 
(London, 1644 [repr. London: J. Haddon, 1848], 2. I have modernized Williams’ archaic 
English. He uses the word ‘informed’ where today we would use ‘enforced.’ 
JOURNAL OF THE ADVENTIST THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
94 
the Christian Church in Nicea in 325, never to be seriously threatened 
after that. What Williams suggests is a different measuring stick for 
Christian doctrine, one by which doctrine cannot be severed from the 
means by which it is promoted and proclaimed. By Williams’ qualitative 
criterion, the New Testament confession that “Jesus Christ has come in 
the flesh” (1 John 4:2) has no meaning when divorced from the qualities 
and values represented by Christ. 
The Protestant reformers urge that the doctrine of justification by 
faith alone be the doctrine by which the church will stand or fall. It is a 
great doctrine, but I agree with Lord Acton that another doctrine equally 
deserves to be accorded this distinction. To Acton, legitimating coercion 
dooms the most auspicious theological project, making it—coercion—
“the breaking point, the article of their system by which they stand or 
fall.”45 
Whether Roger Williams or Lord Acton, the one a Protestant, the 
other a dissenting Roman Catholic, each promotes standards other than 
the ones traditionally accepted by which to measure what is important in 
Christian theology. Each pays attention to the means used to promote the 
cause of faith, and each insists that the only means compatible with the 
Christian profession is the one that accepts the constraint of freedom. 
These rare voices have internalized that the tree of knowledge belongs in 
the midst of the garden along with the tree of life, and they give the ide-
ology of the tree of knowledge the courageous and principled exposure 
often denied to it in the history of Christian theology.  
2. Ellen G. White. When Ellen G. White (1827-1915), the leading 
voice in Seventh-day Adventism, comes on stage, her main work is more 
cognizant of the implications of the tree of knowledge than just about 
any Christian thinker of which I am aware. Her main contribution, the 
five volume Conflict of the Ages series, begins with the question, “Why 
Was Sin Permitted?”46  
This, I submit, is a question that has the tree of knowledge as its 
frame of reference. Focus on the ideology of freedom is maintained with 
striking consistency throughout the five books. In the first volume of the 
                                                
45 Lord (Sir John) Acton, Letter to Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887, in Lord Acton: 
Essays on Freedom and Power (ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb; Gloucester: Peter Smith, 
1972), 333. John R. Bowlin (see n. 30, above), in his discussion of Augustine, leaves 
precisely the impression that one should not hold the Church to a different standard than 
the prevailing cultural norm. This is precisely the view that is so offensive to Lord Acton.  
46 Ellen G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets (Mountain View: Pacific Press, 1958), 
33. 
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series, Patriarchs and Prophets, she strikes the chord of freedom, never 
to let up in the rest of the series. God “takes no pleasure in forced obedi-
ence, and to all He grants freedom of will, that they may render Him vol-
untary service,” she contends.47 In the third volume, The Desire of Ages, 
she writes that “The exercise of force is contrary to the principles of 
God’s government.”48 In yet another chapter in the same book, at a criti-
cal intermission reflecting on the meaning of Jesus’ death, she goes 
where Augustine, Anselm, or even Luther do not venture to tread, claim-
ing resolutely that “Compelling power is found only under Satan’s gov-
ernment.”49 And in the final volume, The Great Controversy, she re-
members what her theme is, repeating almost verbatim the statement 
quoted above from Patriarchs and Prophets. God “takes no pleasure in 
forced allegiance, and to all He grants freedom of will, that they may 
render Him voluntary service.”50 On this point the writer does not mince 
words, and the ideological commitment is focused, pervasive and whole-
hearted. Ellen G. White’s attention to this theme has probably not been 
executed with the same degree of clarity and consistency since the days 
of Origen. What she brings to light in this manner is the neglected, un-
derexposed, and enduring implication of the tree of knowledge of good 
and evil.  
To the contemporary concern that the problem in the consumer so-
cieties of the Western World is an excess of freedom and not its absence, 
51 the answer should be that the hedonistic perversion of freedom must 
also be addressed. This concern, however, does not negate the need to 
pursue the primary meaning of the tree of knowledge or to acknowledge 
that institutional religion has been, and often still is, on the wrong side 
with respect to the issue of coercion.52 Ideologically and historically, 
                                                
47 White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 34. 
48 Ellen G. White, The Desire of Ages (Mountain View: Pacific Press, 1940 [1898]), 
22.  
49 White, The Desire of Ages, 759.  
50 Ellen G. White, The Great Controversy (Mountain View: Pacific Press, 1939 
[1888]), 493.  
51 Cf. Richard Bauckham, God and the Crisis of Freedom: Biblical and Contempo-
rary Perspectives (Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox, 2002).  
52 Concessions on the part of professing Christians to the legitimacy of coercion and 
torture in the current “war on terror” should be seen as a problem of Christian ideology 
rather than a question of American values. The shortcoming in Jane Mayer’s account 
(The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on 
American Ideals [New York: Doubleday, 2008]) is not in the facts but in the notion that 
the ideals that are in jeopardy are primarily American rather than Christian. This short-
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freedom in the sense of the absence of coercion has been the hardest 
thing to accept and the most difficult value to implement. God has indeed 
been remembered chiefly “as the one who prohibits”53 if not as the one 
who resorts to coercion.  
 
V. No Tree of Knowledge? 
The course mapped out for the text concerning the trees in the Gar-
den of Eden in Genesis reaches its final destination in Revelation, in the 
chapter that makes the ending of the biblical narrative fold back on the 
beginning.  
 
Then the angel showed me the river of the water of life, bright 
as crystal, flowing from the throne of God and of the Lamb 
through the middle of the street of the city. On either side of 
the river is the tree of life with its twelve kinds of fruit, pro-
ducing its fruit each month; and the leaves of the tree are for 
the healing of the nations. (Rev 22:1, 2) 
 
This text, of course, counts on the reader’s powers of recognition for 
its force to be felt in full. We have been here before, in our paradise lost. 
The river of life is in the middle, and there, still in the middle, is the tree 
of life. Where, now, however, is the tree of knowledge, conceding that 
there is no mention of the tree of knowledge in Revelation’s description 
of paradise regained?  
Does the omission mean that the tree of knowledge is not there, dug 
up and discarded at some point during the interim between Genesis and 
Revelation? Does it mean that the tree of knowledge is there, but it is not 
mentioned? This might be what my doctoral supervisor at the University 
of St. Andrews would suggest, in line with his understanding of Old Tes-
tament allusions in Revelation. These allusions, says Richard Bauckham, 
“are meant to recall the Old Testament context.”54 When these Old Tes-
tament fragments appear in Revelation, we are supposed to see and recall 
the whole, meaning, we might suppose, that when we read of the tree of 
life we are meant to see the tree of knowledge, too.  
But if the tree of knowledge is not there, considering this option by 
itself, and if the tree signifies God’s core conviction, does it mean that 
                                                                                                         
coming is understandable, given that the ideals in question have been diluted in the name 
of Christian ideology.  
53 Brueggemann, Genesis, 46. 
54 Richard Bauckham, The Climax of Prophecy: Studies in the Book of Revelation 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1993), xi.  
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God has abandoned a core conviction? If the tree of knowledge is not 
there, and if the tree is a symbol of freedom, at least in the sense of ab-
sence of coercion, does it mean that freedom will not have the emphasis 
it once had? Does the apparent absence of the tree of knowledge, or its 
non-mention, mean that God is in retreat on the value of freedom?  
In Revelation, apparently, there is only one tree, but its trunk is di-
vided. “. . . on either side of the river is the tree of life,” says our text of 
the tree that is located in the middle. This detail is not found in Genesis.55 
Why thus a divided trunk, with its two legs apparently arching over the 
river of life, apparently to be joined at the top?  
Richard B. Hays says of narratives that “if we ask why the events of 
a particular story are ordered as they are and not some other way, the 
answer can only be ‘because that is the way it happened’ or ‘because that 
is how the story is told.’”56 The story draws us into its contemplative 
zone, in puzzled awareness of the many things left unsaid. From the story 
come our questions, not the other way around. 
When it comes to the two trees in the Garden of Eden, the text itself, 
the varied history of the interpretation of this text, the endangered status 
of freedom, and the human inclination to act as though the end justifies 
the means, combine to urge readers of the Bible to take a fresh look at 
the meaning of the most challenging of the two trees. If, in Paradise Re-
gained, it appears that the tree of knowledge has outplayed its peculiar 
role, that it is not there, or that it is somehow fused to its sister tree, 
forming an arch over the river of life, we should hesitate to conclude that 
God will ever be in retreat with respect to the ideology of freedom.  
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55 Part of the imagery in Revelation is from Ezekiel 47, giving a more complex pic-
ture than what an allusion to Genesis alone would entail; cf. Barbara Rossing, “River of 
Life in God’s New Jerusalem: An Ecological Vision for Earth’s Future,” Currents in 
Theology and Mission 25 (1998): 487-499.  
56 Richard B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative 
Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (SBLDS 56; Chico: Scholars, 1983; 2nd ed., Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 195. 
